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Introduction
Uncertainty of demand is a problem for …rms in almost any type of industry. In this model we analyze a vertical structure with an upstream monopoly and two downstream retailers.
Demand is uncertain but each retailer receives an informative private signal about the state of the demand. The upstream monopoly can o¤er incentive compatible take-it-orleave-it contracts to the retailers. Allowing for information sharing between the retailers, we construct an incentive compatible and ex ante balanced mechanism which induces the retailers to share their information truthfully. We show that while information sharing can be pro…table for the retailers, it is likely to be detrimental for social welfare as the DIW Berlin, Mohrenstr. 58, 10117 Berlin, Germany, Email: pbaake@diw.de.
y DIW Berlin, Mohrenstr. 58, 10117 Berlin, Germany, Email: aharasser@diw.de. 1 contracts o¤ered by the upstream monopoly tend to involve more downward distortion with information sharing.
There is a number of papers, which analyze …rms' incentives to share information in a single tier industry with uncertain demand. Clark (1983) shows that …rms only have an incentive to share their private information industry wide, if they are able to enforce a collusive agreement vis-à-vis consumers. Gal-Or (1985) analyzes a situation, where …rms receive correlated private signals about the state of demand. However, it is shown that …rms do not want to share their information regardless of the degree of correlation of the signals. Vives (1984) shows for a duopoly market with substitute goods that …rms want to share information under Bertrand, while they do not want to share under Cournot competition, with results being reversed if the …rms'goods are complements. Vives (1990) on the other hand analyzes the e¤ects of di¤erent information disclosure rules on pro…ts and welfare in a market with monopolistic competition. He …nds that only exclusionary disclosure, meaning that only …rms participating in the sharing mechanism receive the aggregated information, leads …rms to share information, while information sharing is only welfare improving in Cournot competition but not in Bertrand competition. 1 Wagenhofer (1990) takes a similar approach to ours in that he allows a …rm to choose a disclosure rule itself, leading to full, partial or no disclosure at all. But while in his paper only one of the …rms is informed and chooses a disclosure rule, in our model both downstream …rms have private information and have to agree on a disclosure rule.
In line with Ziv (1993) , we introduce an ex ante balanced, truthfully revealing mechanism for information sharing. While in his paper there is only one industry layer, we introduce a supplier, who-by using incentive compatible contracts-gives the …rms an incentive to share information in the …rst place. Jiang and Hao (2016) also analyze a vertical structure and allow for both horizontal information sharing and information acquisition by the supplier from retailers. However, while their paper focuses on the determinants of information ‡ow within such an industry, our paper concentrates on the retailers'incentives to share their information truthfully.
Similar to the literature on countervailing power (see for instance Dobson and Waterson, 1997 , for a theoretical analysis or Ellison and Snyder, 2010 , for an empirical evaluation of the argument of countervailing power), our paper analyzes downstream …rms'incentives to cooperate, when facing a monopoly supplier, and the impact of the …rms' decisions concerning cooperation on welfare. As in buyer groups in our model the retailers are able to improve their position vis-à-vis the supplier, as information sharing allows the retailers to better predict the state of demand and makes them less prone to the supplier's price discrimination. However, in contrast to this literature, the …rms in our model cannot use cooperation to exercise any bargaining power directly, but only via the improvement of their information.
Our contribution to the aforementioned literature is the analysis of horizontal information sharing and its impact on contract o¤ers of an upstream monopolist. Furthermore, we focus on the incentives for downstream …rms to share information and allow them to agree on having either no, partial or full information sharing. We also show the existence of an ex ante balanced mechanism to ensure truthful information sharing. In our model, welfare e¤ects are ambiguous. If the precision of the retailers' signals is su¢ ciently high, they share more information than socially desirable.
In the following section we set up our model. The game without information sharing is analyzed in section three. In section four we characterize the equilibrium contracts under di¤erent patterns of information sharing. A payment scheme which induces the retailers to truthfully reveal their signals is presented in section …ve. Optimal information sharing is considered in section six. The …nal section concludes.
The Model
We consider a simple vertical structure with one upstream supplier and two downstream retailers i; j 2 I = f1; 2g; i 6 = j. The supplier produces only one good and o¤ers each retailer a menu of take it or leave contracts. These o¤ers are secret and we assume that retailers have passive beliefs. Furthermore, demand is uncertain but before choosing its contract each retailer receives a private and informative signal about the state of the demand. Considering information sharing we allow the retailers to agree on mediated information sharing involving a third party which transforms private messages received 3 from the retailers into a common message sent back to them.
The timing and formal structure of our model is the following:
1. State of demand is determined by nature: The inverse demand P ( ; x) function can be either high or low P ( ; x) = a x with a 2 fa L ; a H g and
where x denote the total quantity o¤ered. For simplicity we use a H = 1 and a L = 5. The supplier o¤ers each retailer i a menu of contracts including a …xed transfer payment T and a quantity x based on the information the retailers may have 
The game without information sharing
We …rst consider the case without any information sharing. The analysis in this case is rather simple as each retailer has only two information sets and the assumptions of standard adverse selection models turn out to be satis…ed. More precisely, let denote km with k; m 2 fL; Hg the conditional probability for a k given signal s m , i.e., for example
for a = 1, given signal s H and assume that retailer j follows its signal, i.e., chooses C j k if he received s k . Then the expected pro…t of retailer i with signal s H and contract C i H can be written as (the expected
Analyzing the incentive compatibility and participation conditions, i.e.,
shows that the single crossing property holds and that the binding conditions are given by
Employing (1) it is straightforward to determine the optimal contracts for the supplier:
Maximizing the supplier's expected pro…t E given by
we get:
The optimal (symmetric) quantities without information sharing X H ( ; ) and
downwards. The optimal payments are such that T H ( ; ) T L ( ; ) with strict inequality
Proof. See Appendix.
The downward distortion of X L ( ; ) is due to the observation that the pro…t from deviating by choosing C L instead of C H is increasing in x L . Hence, the incentive compatible payment T H is the higher the lower x L which implies that X L ( ; ) is lower than in the case without any binding incentive condition.
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For later reference let E ( ) denote the retailers' expected pro…t without information sharing
4 Information sharing with veri…able Information
With partial information L there are three possible signal and information combinations.
Thus, the supplier can restrict its o¤ers to three possible contracts C i H0 ; C i LH and C i LL (see Figure 1 ).
Assuming incentive compatibility, retailer i 0 's expected pro…t given its own signal is s H and the message is M P L = (0) can be written as denote the conditional probability for a = 1 and a = , respectively, given message M P L = (0) and own signal s H . The retailers'expected pro…ts for the other cases can be calculated analogously.
Turning to the retailers'incentive and participation constraints, we proceed by assuming
is binding. Taking into account the incentive conditions for retailers with signal s L , i.e.,
and solving the maximization problem of the supplier, we get that the optimal contracts of the supplier duplicate the contracts o¤ered without information sharing:
Lemma 2 The optimal (symmetric) quantities with partial information sharing L, de-
The induced …xed payments and the retailers' expected pro…ts are the same as in the case without information sharing.
Intuitively, partial information sharing L does not change the information of retailers with signal s H . With s i = s L and M P L = (0) retailer i knows that retailer j will o¤er the high quantity X H0 . However, the retailer with s L has a higher posterior for high demand due to the other retailer receiving signal s H . With M P L = (s L ; s L ) both retailers know that they both got bad signals which implies that the posterior probability for high demand is low.
However, they know that both of them will choose to supply a low quantity. As in any case the countervailing e¤ects on expected demand and supply by the other retailer cancel, the optimal response of the supplier is to design his contracts such that this information is ignored. Therefore, he o¤ers the same contracts as in the case of no information sharing.
Partial Information Sharing H
In contrast to above, information sharing H induces the supplier to o¤er di¤erent contracts than in case of no information sharing. Intuitively, information sharing H is "good news"
as in expectation the possible information rent is higher due to the case of one retailer having signal s H , while the other retailer having signal s L . In this case the retailer with signal s H has information for high demand, and can infer the other retailer's low demand signal. In contrast, the retailer with signal s L cannot make any inference, leading to an informational advantage for the retailer with signal s H . Exploiting this advantage leads to a relatively high information rents in this scenario.
There are again three possible signal and information combinations. Thus, the supplier can restrict its o¤ers to three contracts C i HH ; C i HL and C i L0 (see Figure 1) . denote the conditional probability for a = 1 and a = , respectively, given M H = (s H ; s H ).
The retailers'expected pro…ts for the other cases can be calculated analogously.
Turning to the retailers'incentive and participation constraints, we proceed by assuming that x i HL x i HH holds and that the incentive conditions are binding downwards, i.e., that the optimal contracts o¤ered by the supplier satisfy
Using (8)- (10) maximization of the supplier's expected pro…ts leads to Lemma 3 The optimal (symmetric) quantities with partial information sharing H, denoted by X P H HL ( ; ); X P H HH ( ; ) and X P H L0 ( ; ), are such that X P H HL ( ; ) > X P H HH ( ; ) > X P H L0 ( ; ). X P H HL ( ; ) is not distorted, X P H HH ( ; ) and X P H L0 ( ; ) are distorted downwards. The optimal payments satisfy T P H HL ( ; ) T P H HH ( ; ) T P H L0 ( ; ) with strict inequalities for > 0.
The distortion results are based on the same reasoning as in the case of no information sharing. Analyzing the payments T HH ; T L0 and T HL implied by (8)- (10) shows that x LH does not a¤ect T HH and T L0 , whereas T HL is decreasing in x HH and x L0 . Additionally, x L0 also a¤ects T HH negatively.
Let E P H ( ; ) denote the expected pro…t of the retailers with partial information sharing H: 
Complete Information Sharing
Assume
HH is again given by (see (7))
In order to proceed, note …rst that the single crossing property does not hold for 
and check whether the solutions lead to
) and
Using (13)- (15) and solving for the optimal quantities we get Lemma 4 With complete information sharing, the optimal (symmetric) quantities X C HH ( ; ); X C HL ( ; ) and X C LL ( ; ) are such that X C HH ( ; ) > X C HL ( ; ) > X C LL ( ; ). While X C HH ( ; ) is undistorted, X C HL ( ; ) and X C LL ( ; ) are distorted downwards. The optimal payments satisfy T C HH ( ; ) T C HL ( ; ) T C LL ( ; ) with strict inequalities for 2 (0; 1].
Again, the payments T HH ; T HL and T LL which solve (13)-(15) are such that x HH does not a¤ect T HL and T LL , whereas T HH is decreasing in x HL and x LL . Additionally, T HL decreases in x LL .
Let E c ( ; ) denote the expected pro…t of the retailers with complete information sharing:
Comparison of the optimal quantities
Before we proceed with analyzing the retailers'incentives to report their signals truthfully in the next section, we compare the optimal quantities under the di¤erent information sharing agreements. As already mentioned, information sharing L leads to the same allocations as no information sharing.
Lemma 5
The optimal quantities under the di¤ erent information structures satisfy
Given a retailer receives signal s H , his willingness to pay for a high quantity is higher, if he knows that the other retailer has signal s L , as if he does not know the other retailer's signal or if this signal is s H as well. This leads to X P H HL ( ; ) > X C HH ( ; ). The best response to the high quantity X P H HL , is a low quantity X P H L0 which is further decreased to soften the incentive constraint for the case in which both retailers receive s H (see (9) ).
Considering the total quantities o¤ered to consumers, we get:
Corollary 1 Compared to the case with no information sharing, partial information sharing unambiguously reduces the quantities o¤ ered to consumers,.i.e.,
Complete information sharing does not a¤ ect the quantities o¤ ered; if both retailers receive s H . In the other cases the total quantities are either lower or higher, i.e.,
For consumers partial information sharing is never bene…cial. 
Inducing truth-telling
Turning to the incentives of the retailers to truthfully reveal their signal, one might argue that each retailer has an incentive to deviate by always reporting s L in order to induce the other retailer to believe a = and thus to choose a contract with a lower quantity. 14 This together with X P H HL X P H HH decreases the quantity the other retailer o¤ers. In fact, it turns out that the binding constraint for the payment scheme is that each retailer must not have an incentive to report s H instead of s L .
In the following we will characterize simple payment schemes which induce truth telling and which are ex ante balanced, i.e., which do not lead to burning any money in expectation.
Partial Information Sharing H
Note …rst that with partial information sharing H the payment of each retailer has to be based on the retailer's signal only. This is simply due to the fact that payments based on both signals would lead to full information sharing.
Ex ante balance of the payment scheme requires
where z k denotes the payment a retailer has to make if he reports s k .
Since the decisions whether the retailers report their signal truthfully takes place after receiving their signals we need to calculate the retailers'expected pro…ts in stage four of the game, i.e., the stage in which retailers-given their signals-decide which signal they report to the third party. 
The other possible deviation strategies-given signal s H -are to report s L and to choose either (T P H HL ; x P H HL ) or (T P H L0 ; x P H L0 ). Similarly, with signal s L a retailer can deviate by reporting s H and by choosing either (T P H HH ; x P H HH ); (T P H HL ; x P H HL ) or (T P H L0 ; x P H L0 ) depending on wether
Comparing the expected pro…ts for all possible deviation strategies it turns out that the binding constraint is such that truthfully reporting s L and choosing C P H L0 must not be dominated by reporting s H and choosing C P H L0 irrespectively of the message sent back from the third party, i.e., we must have
Solving for the implied payment leads to Let E D i ( ; s H ) denote the optimal deviation pro…t given signal s H . Similarly, suppose that retailer i has gotten signal s L but reports s H . Then, the optimal deviation strategy is to choose C LL irrespective of the report retailer j sends. Let
Complete Information Sharing
denote the optimal deviation pro…t given signal s L . In order to guarantee truth-telling and thus (honest) information sharing between the retailers, the payments have to be such that the following two inequalities are satis…ed
Assume that
and let z C LH and z C HL denote the solutions of (19) as functions of z LL and z HH and all other parameters. Using (18) to solve for z HH we are left with z LL which we can normalize to 0 since the payment scheme is balanced. The exact values of the payments z C HH ; z C HL and z C LH are given in the appendix.
Optimal Information Sharing and Social Welfare
Our …nal step is to analyze whether it is optimal for the retailers to implement partial or complete information sharing. For this purpose we simply have to compare the retailers' pro…t under either sharing agreements.
Proposition 1
The retailers agree on partial information as long as is su¢ ciently low. Considering social welfare we get that there is only a small region where the behavior of the retailers is in line with welfare considerations. More precisely, let EW ; EW P H and EW C denote expected social welfare measured as the sum of expected consumer surplus and supplier's and retailers' expected pro…ts with no information sharing ( ), partial information sharing H (P H) and complete information sharing (C), respectively.
Then, we get
Proposition 2 Complete information sharing is socially optimal for < 1 p 3 ; for > 1 p 3 no information sharing is socially desirable:
Proposition 2 resembles Corollary 1 and shows that the distortions induced by partial information sharing always lead to lower welfare as compared to no information sharing.
Comparing no information sharing and full information sharing, the welfare gain due to X H ( ; ) + X L ( ; ) > 2X C HL ( ; ) more then compensates the welfare loss due to 2X L ( ; ) < 2X C LL ( ; ) if the signal precision is su¢ ciently high, i.e., if > 1 p 3 .
However, if < 1 p 3 it holds that X H ( ; ) + X L ( ; ) < 2X C HL ( ; ) and then both e¤ects are in favor of information sharing. that it is not only collective bargaining, which allows the retailers to exert pressure on the supplier, but also some more intricate devices as di¤erent regimes of information sharing, which allow them to increase their rents. Therefore policy evaluation in this domain should not look only at the immediate e¤ects of coordination, but consider more complex variants of cooperation among …rms.
Appendix

Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Using the solutions for T i H and T i L from solving (1) the optimal quantities follow from maximizing (2) with respect to x i H and x i L and solving the respective 20 …rst order conditions using symmetry. The optimal symmetric quantities are given by
The no distortion result for X H ( ; ) follows from @ T i L @x i H = 0. On the other hand, evaluating @ T i H @x i L at the equilibrium quantities leads to @ T i H @x i L < 0 and thus to a downward distortion.
Proof of Lemma 2
In order to prove the lemma, assume …rst that the binding conditions are given by
Then, solving the supplier's optimization problem leads to
Similarly, assume that the binding conditions are given by
which again contradicts incentive compatibility. Therefore, the optimal contracts of the supplier must be such that there is no information sharing induced separation between 21 retailers with signals s L , i.e., the messages M P L = (0) and
the o¤ered contracts and we have X P L LL ( ; ) = X P L LH ( ; ). Since this also implies that the supplier o¤ers only two contracts, the optimal contracts must duplicate the optimal contracts in the case of no information sharing.
Proof of Lemma 3
The expected pro…t of the supplier in the case with partial information H sharing is given by
Using the solutions for T 1 HL ; T 1 HH and T 1 L0 from solving (8)- (10) 
where all derivatives are evaluated at the equilibrium quantities.
Proof of Lemma 5
Using the optimal quantities given in lemma 1-4, the proof 
Payments with complete information sharing
The payments which ensure honest reporting of the received signals with complete information sharing are given by z C LL = 0 and 
